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Abstract
In this note we analyze the role of business taxation for corporate risk-taking un-
der di¤erent accounting principles (such as mark-to-market, lower-of-cost-or-market and
historical cost). We demonstrate that conservative accounting may imply incentives to
overinvest in risky assets. If tax loss o¤set opportunities are less than perfect, the mark-
to-market principle penalizes risky investment whereas more conservative accounting
leaves the risk choice una¤ected.
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1 Introduction
According to the literature1, the choice of accounting principle may a¤ect corporate risk-
taking if, rst, accounting numbers serve as a performance indicator in principal-agent
relationships, e.g. between outside investors and managers,2 and second, if markets are
dysfunctional, e.g. su¤er from liquidity constraints.3 In this note, we o¤er a third per-
spective. We argue that accounting principles are crucial in understanding how corporate
taxes a¤ect risk-taking.4
We build a model in which investors have complete information and markets are
perfect. A representative risk-neutral rm invests in one unit of an asset. It chooses
from a continuum of assets di¤ering in income and risk properties. Perfect competition
among investors drives up asset prices until the expected payo¤ is equal across all income
and risk categories. The corporate tax base is determined following specic accounting
principles of which we consider three: mark-to-market (MM, henceforth), pure historical
cost (HC) and lower-of-cost-or-market (LCM). We derive the corporations exposure to
risk (risk-neutrality) and the level of investment (investment neutrality).
We demonstrate that, with perfect loss o¤set, HC and MM accounting are risk-
neutral and potentially investment neutral (depending on the relative size of the tax
rates involved). However, the LCM rule implies an ine¢ ciently high exposure to risk.
The reason is that it introduces an asymmetry into corporate taxation: whereas asset
depreciations lead to a tax credit, asset appreciations are ignored. Given that the LCM
principle is sometimes considered to induce conservative (i.e. risk-averse) investment
behavior, this nding may be regarded as a surprise. With imperfect loss o¤set, the
LCM and the HC principles are risk-neutral. The MM principle, however, implies a
penalty for risky assets, i.e. the risk exposure is ine¢ ciently small. The reason is that,
whereas asset appreciations trigger a tax payment, asset depreciations do not yield a tax
credit.
Usually, nancial and tax accounting follow two distinct set of rules; tax accounting
is usually rather conservative, i.e. taxation is often based on lower-of-cost-or-market or
historical cost systems instead of market prices. Nevertheless, most countries impose
1See Fields, Lys and Vincent (2001) for a survey.
2See Plantin et al. (2008), Edgerton (2011) as well as Shackelford et al. (2011). McNichols and
Stubben (2008) empirically examine the e¤ect of earnings management on rmsinvestment decisions.
Graham et al. (2010) nd on the basis of a survey of tax executives that avoiding nancial accounting
tax expenses is as important as saving "cash taxes" concerning the location decision and repatriation
decision of foreign investments.
3Allen and Carletti (2008) show that mark-to-market accounting can lead to contagion e¤ects in
situations where accounting based on historical cost does not. Plantin et al. (2008) demonstrate that
mark-to-market accounting may lead to suboptimal decisions by injecting articial volatility into trans-
action prices. For a comprehensive discussion on fair value accounting and its impact on the nancial
crisis see Laux and Leuz (2009) and IMF (2008).
4There are very few theoretical contributions that recognize the role of accounting principles for the
analysis of corporate taxation (or business taxation in general). An early exemption is Kanniainen and
Soedersten (1995) who analyze the limitations of reporting principles on a rms dividend policy. A
general framework for analyzing corporate taxation and accounting rules is provided by Shackelford et
al. (2011).
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a minimum level of book-tax-conformity5, and there has recently been a debate on the
virtues of uniform reporting where the nancial statement and taxation are based on
the same set of accounting numbers. In this context, the current US administration
(The White House and The Department of the Treasury 2012) proposes higher book-tax
conformity, and the European Commission (2001) considers the IFRS framework as a
starting point for the implementation of a common consolidated corporate tax base.
The next section lays out the model and derives the results. Section 3 summarizes
the results and concludes.
2 The model
Consider a small open economy with a large number of identical rms which live for
two periods, t = 1; 2. In period 1, the representative rm decides whether or not to
acquire a risky asset and, in period 2, the asset yields income. There is a continuum of
assets, indexed by j. Each rm is constrained to invest in one unit of asset only. Assets
di¤er in expected income 1 +  (j) where  (j) 2  ; +. After acquisition, an asset
specic information, ", is revealed which alters the expected income to 1+ (j)+". This
(information) shock is idiosyncratic and distributed with zero mean and variance ", i.e.
"  (0; ").
The initial asset owners have a uniform reservation asset valuation of unity implying
that the asset price in period 1, denoted by p1 (j), has to be at least equal to one.
Investment is nanced by equity raised from investors whose (non-tax) opportunity cost
is given by the world market interest rate r. Finally, we assume that rms and investors
are risk-neutral. Firms are assumed to maximize the present expected value of cash
ows. This implies that accounting information are only used for tax purposes.
2.1 Benchmark case
For benchmarking purposes, we consider investment decisions made in the absence of
taxes. With E (") = 0 the expected net present value, V1 (j), of investing in asset j with
expected income 1 +  (j) is
V1 (j) =  p1 (j) + 1 +  (j)
1 + r
(1)
Perfect competition implies that expected discounted income equals the asset price.
Consequently, the value of all assets are a priori zero. Thus, asset prices are given by
p1 (j) =
1+(j)
1+r and marginal yields by
~ = r.
We dene an accounting principle as investment neutral if asset prices and marginal
yields are given as in the benchmark case. An accounting principle is risk-neutral if asset
prices and marginal yields do not depend on the degree of risk, as measured by ". Note
that investment neutrality is a su¢ cient condition for risk-neutrality, and risk-neutrality
is a necessary condition for investment neutrality.
5See Hanlon and Shevlin (2005) for a detailed overview and discussion on the issues surrounding the
proposals on book-tax conformity in the US.
3
2.2 Accounting based taxation
Now assume that the tax base is determined according to MM, LCM or HC accounting.
When the asset is acquired, the book value under all three accounting principles is p1 (j).
Similarly, when the asset matures, the book value is p2 (j) = 1+ (j)+~" where ~" denotes
the realized shock. The principles di¤er, though, in how book values change when the
shock " occurs. Let b"1 denote the book value in period 1 just after the shock has been
revealed.
We assume that, rst, shareholder taxes, i.e. capital gains taxes and dividend taxes,
are zero; it is, however, straightforward to show that all results hold if symmetric share-
holder taxation is considered.6 Second, the representative rms taxable income is as-
sumed to be large enough to fully utilize any tax credits, an assumption that is relaxed
in the next subsection. Third, tax credits received in the rst period stay within the
rm (i.e. are not distributed as dividends) and yield an interest rate of r which is taxed
at the corporate tax rate  ; equivalently, tax debt is nanced by debt contracts and the
resulting interest payments can be deducted from the corporate tax base. Fourth, the
investorsalternative is taxed at a rate of m  0. Finally, after the asset has matured,
all income (and remaining cash in the rm) is distributed to the investor and the rm
is (costlessly) dissolved.
Independent of the accounting principle, the expected after-tax value of investing in
asset j is given by
V1 (j) =  p1 (j) + 1 +  (j)  1 (j) (1 + r (1  ))  2 (j)
1 + r (1 m) (2)
where 1 (j)  b"1 (j)   p1 (j) and 2 (j)  1 +  (j)   b"1 (j) dening the expected tax
bases in period 1 and 2, respectively, as well as
b"1;MM (j) = ~p1 (j)
b"1;HC (j) = p1 (j) (3)
b"1;LCM (j) = min [p1 (j) ; ~p1 (j)]
with ~p1 (j) =
1+(j)+~"
1+r( 1 m1  )
denoting the market price after the shock is revealed.7 To rule
out insensible results we make the following assumption:
Assumption 1 The present value of tax deductions related to purchasing the asset at
6Asymmetric shareholder taxation, i.e. the absence of tax refunds in the case of capital losses, however
introduces a downward bias in investment that increases in the level of risk. More information is available
from the authors upon request.
7After the shock is revealed, the asset could be sold to outside investors. Investors bid until the
market price satises
 ~p1 (j) + 1 +  (j) + ~"   (1 +  (j) + ~"  ~p1 (j))
1 + r (1 m) = 0 (4)
which implies ~p1 (j) =
1+(j)+~"
1+r( 1 m1  )
.
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a price of p1 (j) must not exceed p1 (j).
Under MM accounting, the shock " triggers a tax credit if ~p1 (j) < p1 (j) and tax pay-
ments if ~p1 (j) > p1 (j) which corresponds to higher or, respectively, lower tax payments
in the second period. The net expected tax payment (or credit) due to ~p1 (j) 6= p1 (j) is
zero since E(") = 0. Thus, the introduction of risk does not change investment behavior.
Prices are given by p1 (j) =
1+(j)
1+r( 1 m1  )
and the marginal yield is ~ = r 1 m1  .
Under HC accounting, revaluations are not reected in a change in book values, i.e.
1 (j) = 0. Asset prices in period 1 are given by p1 (j) =
1+(j)
1+r( 1 m1  )
and the marginal
yield by ~ = r

1 m
1 

; thus, outcomes are equivalent to the MM scenario.
Under the LCM principle, unrealized prots due to appreciations do not enter the
tax base in contrast to depreciations. Let  denote the probability that the asset price
depreciates, ~p1 (j) < p1 (j), and let E "  E (" : ~p1 (j) < p1 (j)) be the mean expected
shock given that the asset price depreciates. Then, the expected tax credit in period 1
is 

1+(j)+E "
1+r( 1 m1  )
  p1 (j)

which is compensated by expected additional tax payments
in period 2 of the same size. The di¤erent timing of tax credits and payments, though,
gives rise to a distortion. Competition among investors implies that, for all j, prices
are given by p1 (j) =
1+(j) 
sE "
1+r 1 m
1 
where 
s  r
1+r( 1 m1   )
> 0  the superscript
s denoting symmetric tax treatment of gains and losses  and the marginal yield is
~ = r 1 m1  + 

sE " .8 With E " < 0 the accounting based tax system inates asset
prices and increases risky investment.
We summarize these ndings in Proposition 1.
Proposition 1 Assume that taxation is accounting based. Then, marginal yields are
given by
(i) ~ = r 1 m1  under MM,
(ii) ~ = r 1 m1  under HC, and
(iii) ~ = r 1 m1  + 

sE " under LCM accounting.
Thus, both the mark-to-market and the historical cost principle yield risk-neutrality
and, if m =  , investment neutrality. In contrast, the LCM principle is neither in-
vestment nor risk-neutral. If m =  , there is overinvestment in risky assets under LCM.
Considering that the LCM principle is often associated with some notion of conservatism
in accounting and investment, the overinvestment result may be surprising.
2.3 Corporate tax asymmetries
In practice, tax credits usually do not imply actual tax refunds. Rather, a rm is allowed
to use the tax credit to lower tax payments on other income. If there is no other income,
losses can be carried forward (at least for a limited number of periods).
8The denominator of 
s being positive follows directly from Assumption 1.
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Now, we modify the above model and assume that there is no other taxable income
against which book losses in period 1 could be credited. This implies that the loss has
to be o¤set in period 2 where, by assumption, there is su¢ cient taxable income.9 The
after-tax value of investing in the investment project j is given by
V1 (j) =  p1 (j)   max f0;1 (j)g+ 1 +  (j) + ~"   min f1 (j) + 2 (j) ;2 (j)g
1 + r (1 m)
(5)
with 1 (j) and 2 (j) given below equation (2).
Under MM, the rm has to pay taxes if the asset is appreciated, i.e. ~p1 (j) > p1 (j),
but cannot use the corresponding tax credits if ~p1 (j) < p1 (j). Asset prices can be shown
to equal p1 (j) =
1+(j)+
asE "
1+r 1 m
1 
with 
as  r
1+r 1 m
1   r(1 )
> 0  the superscript
as denoting asymmetric tax treatment of gains and losses  and the marginal yield
by ~ = r 1 m1    
asE " .10 Note that the distortion has a similar size, though a
di¤erent sign, as the one under the LCM principle with full loss o¤sets. Under HC,
1 (j) = 0 and, thus, the results derived in section 2.2 remain unchanged. Under LCM,
only depreciations are reected while appreciations do not alter the tax base. Since there
is no taxable income which the losses can be credited against, a loss is carried forward.
Thus, in economic terms, the LCM principle yields the same results as the HC principle.
These ndings are summarized in Proposition 2.
Proposition 2 Assume that taxation is accounting based and losses cannot be credited
against other taxable income in period 1, but can be carried forward to period 2. Then,
marginal yields are given by
(i) ~ = r 1 m1    
asE " under MM,
(ii) ~ = r 1 m1  under HC, and
(iii) ~ = r 1 m1  under LCM.
Thus, the MM principle is neither investment nor risk-neutral; if m =  , there
is underinvestment in risky projects. The HC and LCM principles are economically
equivalent. Asset prices and the level of investment are the same as under the HC
principle with perfect loss o¤set. Thus, both rules yield risk-neutrality and, if m =  ,
investment neutrality.
3 Summary
Summing up, the allegedly conservative lower-of-cost-or-market principle acts as a sub-
sidy to risk. If loss o¤set is imperfect, the MM principle yields underinvestment in risky
assets. Only HC valuation is risk-neutral and, potentially, investment neutral in both
cases.
9Assuming that there may not be su¢ cient income in period 2 is also possible, however complicates
the analysis without yielding new insights. In general, risk-taking is strongly discouraged.
10Again, 
as > 0 follows from Assumption 1.
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